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https://rfos.fon.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1009Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Kuzmanović, Marija | |
| dc.creator | Đurović, Milena | |
| dc.creator | Martić, Milan | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-05-12T10:34:19Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-05-12T10:34:19Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1840-1503 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://rfos.fon.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1009 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper deals with the cooperative behaviour of participants in social dilemmas of one-shot Prisoner's dilemma type. The aim of the study was to experimentally determine whether there is an influence of participants' gender, faculty department and social value orientation on the cooperation rate in the games, and whether the influence of these factors on the cooperation rate remains the same under the influence of various external stimuli. In accordance with the objectives of the study, five hypotheses were proposed. Testing of hypotheses revealed that the gender, faculty department and social value orientation have no significant influence on participants' behaviour, if there is an external stimulus. Changes in the behaviour of participants i.e. increase in the cooperation rate came after the influence of two stimuli: (1) when the opponent was known in advance, and (2) when the structure of payoff matrix was changed. Although it was expected that the cooperation rate would be higher if the participants are motivated by additional (bonus) credits on the exam, it was shown that this stimulus does not have enough significant impact on the cooperation rate. | en |
| dc.rights | restrictedAccess | |
| dc.source | Technics Technologies Education Management / TTEM | |
| dc.subject | Social value orientation | en |
| dc.subject | Social dilemma | en |
| dc.subject | Prisoner's dilemma | en |
| dc.subject | Game theory | en |
| dc.subject | Cooperation | en |
| dc.title | Factors affecting cooperation in social dilemmas: Experimental evidence from oneshot prisoner's dilemma | en |
| dc.type | article | |
| dc.rights.license | ARR | |
| dc.citation.epage | 392 | |
| dc.citation.issue | 1 | |
| dc.citation.other | 7(1): 384-392 | |
| dc.citation.rank | M23 | |
| dc.citation.spage | 384 | |
| dc.citation.volume | 7 | |
| dc.identifier.rcub | conv_3144 | |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-84859296760 | |
| dc.type.version | publishedVersion | |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
| item.grantfulltext | none | - |
| item.openairetype | article | - |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Radovi istraživača / Researchers’ publications | |
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