Agencijska dilema - informaciona asimetrija u problemu 'poslodavac-unajmljenik'

Abstract

Posedovanjem nepotpunih i nesavršenih informacija, učesnici na tržištu ne ostvaruju optimalnu alokaciju resursa koja bi bila moguća u slučaju potpune informisanosti. S druge strane, blagovremena i relevantna informacija predstavlja proizvod za koji mora da se plati odgovarajuća tržišna cena. U savremenim korporacijama dve strane angažovane u nekom ugovoru, mogu imati različite ciljeve i posedovati različit nivo informacija. Ovaj problem poznat je pod nazivom problem 'poslodavac-unajmljenik'. Unajmljenici ponekad imaju lične ciljeve koji se ne podudaraju sa ciljevima poslodavca, pa je poslodavac taj koji mora da zadovolji sopstvene, ali i potrebe unajmljenika. Jedan od načina je i da unajmljenika motiviše nagradama, zabranama i kaznama. U ovom slučaju, kvalitativna ocena potreba i procena troškova dovodi po povećanja efikasnosti i bržeg rešavanja problema. U ovom radu ukazano je na značaj ekonomije informacija za funkcionisanje i rezultat tržišnih procesa. Za modeliranje tržišnih odnosa u uslovima kada su strane asimetrično informisane, korišćena je metodologija teorije igara. Problem 'poslodavac-unajmljenik' modeliran je kao Bajesova ekstenzivna igra, a rešenje je dobijeno primenom koncepta Bajes-Nešovog ekvilibrijuma. .

By possessing incomplete and imperfect information, market participants do not achieve the optimal allocation of resources that would be possible in the case of possessing complete information. On the other hand, timely and relevant information represents a product for which the appropriate market price must be paid. In modern corporations, the two sides engaged in a contract may have different goals and have different levels of information. This problem is called the 'principal-agent' problem. Agents sometimes have personal goals that do not coincide with the goals of the principal, thus the principal must achieve its own, but also the needs of agents. One way is to motivate the agent using rewards, prohibitions and penalties. In this case, the qualitative needs assessment and evaluation of costs results in greater efficiency and faster problem solving. The paper points out the importance of economics of information for the operation and the result of market processes. To model market relations in a situation where two parties are asymmetrically informed, the methodology of game theory is used. The problem of 'principal-agent' is modelled as the Bayesian game, where the solution is obtained using the concept of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. .